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Abstract 
 
The blockchain comes with the promise of being a 
disruptive technology with the potential for novel 
ways of interaction in a wide range of applications. 
Although scholarly interest in the technology is 
growing, a broad analysis of blockchain applications 
from a governance perspective lacks to date. This 
research pays special attention to the governance of 
blockchain systems and illustrates core governance 
decisions on 15 blockchain systems from four 
application domains. Based on academic literature, 
semi-structured interviews with representatives from 
those companies, and content analysis of grey 
literature, different blockchain governance decisions 
have been derived and their enactment described. 
The identification of them enriches the scarce body of 
knowledge on blockchain systems with a better 
understanding of how key governance decisions are 
enacted in practice. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
In recent years, the blockchain technology emerged 
from a provider of cryptocurrencies to an alternative 
fashion to maintain and share data in a collaborative 
manner. All over the globe, organizations of all sorts 
form consortia to explore the merits of this 
technology. Those merits vary from product 
innovation or optimization of inter-organizational 
business processes by replacing third-party-
authentication with the algorithmic that blockchain 
natively provide. 
Despite all the enthusiasm, how those efforts are 
governed – also beyond who is formally in charge - 
remains an open question. The history of research on 
open as well as inter-organizational collaboration is 
long; despite being fundamentally different, 
collaboration within both has not always been 
fruitful, due to mistrust, missing say, or own interests 
[1], [2] – the governance of inter-organizational 
collaboration is of utmost importance as it safeguards 
involved party’s interests [3]. Our research sheds 
light on how blockchain systems are governed, 
seeing governance as decision rights placement and 
enactment. We thereby derive six core decisions and 
illustrates their enactment on 15 cases complemented 
with 18 semi-structured expert interviews with 
representatives from those cases.  
Little is known about what and how key decisions are 
made and enforced in blockchain systems [3]. 
Decision-making and enactment can be conducted in 
several ways as it can be seen in free-and-open-
source (FOSS) projects [4] or business networks [5]; 
even in those, collaboration may vary greatly. There 
is a plethora of governance frameworks in IT, in the 
corporate realm, public administration, and many 
more; a governance framework for blockchain 
systems examining the generic roles, responsibilities, 
decision rights, or incentives of actors in a blockchain 
system is yet to be defined. This gap in literature is 
motivating, not least because the number of 
blockchain projects is steadily increasing. 
Hence, this research answers the incumbent call for 
research on how blockchain systems are governed 
[6], [7]; not only to improve their well-functioning 
from an organizational perspective [8], but also to 
anticipate future inhibitors which may arise and the 
changes they bring to various domains [9]. Therefore, 
this research answers the following research 
questions: 
 
RQ1: What are major decisions about blockchain 
systems? 
RQ2: How are those key decisions enacted in 
practice? 
 
Section 2 provides an introduction to the research 
topic and introduces the reader to the field of 
governance in general as well as from a blockchain 
perspective. Next, section 3 details this research’s 
underlying methodology. Section 4 presents the 
results of the analysis, with a narrow focus on 
blockchain decisions and how they are enacted. In 
section 5, the results are discussed against the 
background of the works identified in section 2. 
Section 6 concludes by giving an outlook for future 
research venues.  
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2. Related Work  
 
2.1 Blockchain Systems 
 
As this paper centers on governance, a technical 
explanation of how blockchains work is not 
considered here. However, to grasp the main 
differences in decision-making processes that 
blockchain brings about, it is helpful to use existing 
classifications of blockchain systems and to outline 
their main characteristics. A blockchain system is 
hereby defined as the underlying technology 
(blockchain) and its organizational embedment 
(community surrounding the blockchain and its 
utilization). Following the notion of Peters and 
Panayi [10], a classification of blockchain systems 
can be seen along the access to transactions (public or 
private) and transaction validation rights 
(permissioned or permissionless). 
Table 1. Classification of Blockchain Types, 
adapted from Peters and Panayi [10] 
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Access to Transaction Validation 
Permissioned Permissionless 
Public 
All nodes can 
read/submit 
transactions;authorized 
nodes validate 
transactions. 
All nodes can 
read, submit, 
and validate 
transactions. 
Private 
Only authorized nodes 
can read, submit, and 
validate transactions. 
N/A 
Blockchains proved to overcome the double-
spending problem and, hence, bring rivalry to digital 
settings [8]. With this characteristic of native 
authentication of rightfulness [8], blockchain systems 
became increasingly interesting in domains which 
use to rely on third parties to provide authentication, 
such as banks or notaries; a blockchain system, 
hence, can provide trustworthy data: if entered data is 
correct, the ledger can guarantee its immutability, at 
least in prospect. This reliability is fostered through 
the blockchain’s characteristics of decentralization 
(no central entity), persistency (transactions cannot 
be deleted), auditability (traceability of events), and 
anonymity (key pairs) [11], [12]; the latter may vary 
depending on the utilized type of blockchain systems.  
 
2.2 Governance from different perspectives 
 
The meaning of governance is tailored to its 
application domain, with the most prominent being 
political [13], IT [14], social sciences [15], or 
industrial [16] governance. At its core, governance 
describes how responsibilities and powers are aligned 
among actors, who decides, how the decision-making 
process is conducted, and how decision-makers are 
held accountable. According to well-known works 
from social sciences, governance structures can 
roughly be classified into markets, hierarchies, and 
networks [16], [17]. Decision-making rights and their 
enactment are thereby placed either on individual 
actors’ (markets, free choice), formal organization 
(hierarchy, authority), or on consortia’s level 
(networks, consensus). To understand the nature of 
how decision-rights are allocated and enacted in 
blockchain systems, the overall process of alignment, 
translation, and deployment of business / community 
goals into technological outcomes has to be 
understood. Hence, we consider the broader notion of 
the governance of IT systems; this lens is helpful to 
understand the interplay between the emergence of 
requirements towards a technology and the factors 
that assure its successful implementation [18]. Weill 
[14] defined five core decisions to be made: IT 
principles (how is IT used in business), IT 
architecture (technical choices), IT infrastructure 
strategies (strategies for base foundation), business 
application needs (specifying business needs for 
development), and IT investment and prioritization 
(decisions on how project approval is conducted). 
The efficiency gains through decision placement has 
been found to amount to more than 40% [19].  
 
2.3 Governance of Blockchains Systems 
 
Because of its decentralized nature, the 
governance of blockchain systems may differ from 
known governance archetypes, such as markets or 
hierarchies. Public and permissionless blockchain 
systems, such as Bitcoin or Ethereum, received 
increasing attention of researchers [7], [20]–[23]; 
their governance can be characterized as tribal [8]. In 
tribes, actors tend to organize in loosely defined 
groups which are always on the brink of creating new 
tribes (forks), as long as long as the overall 
organization benefits from a critical mass to maintain 
the system and stabilize its value (e.g., its underlying 
currency). The architects of those systems, for the 
initial design as well as later enhancements, are 
typically core developers (e.g., [24]). Open source 
principles, which are commonly adopted here and 
allow users to propose changes to the system as they 
see fit, can be supported by developers, but they need 
to find the agreement of other core actors, especially 
miners and token-owners. Having no entity formally 
in charge [21], those decision-making cycles have 
proven painfully complicated and ineffective, leading 
to governance crises posing constant threats to the 
community [9]. While the decision-making is 
formally placed on the sides of miners’, users’ and 
developer’s, it has to be mentioned, that prominent 
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figures (e.g., Vitalik Buterin) hold major influence on 
public opinions, and hence, on system architecture 
development; differently from other information 
systems, however, the developers’ or public opinion 
leaders’ influence can be counterbalanced by either 
miners’ or users’ [3], [21].  
The prospect of digital scarcity (hence 
uniqueness) of data attracted interests also from 
domains other than cryptocurrencies, contributing to 
the increasing popularity of permissioned blockchain 
systems led by consortia (e.g., Corda [25]). Inter-
organizational collaboration requires a consensus 
among collaborating parties, which proved to be a 
challenging task [1], [26], inhibited by inter alia lack 
of trust amongst collaborators, own interest, or inter-
firm rivalry. So, governance in inter-organizational 
settings provides an agreed upon playbook to ease 
those issues and foster collaboration [1]–[3], [27]. 
By its very nature, permissioned blockchains vary 
from permissionless ones in the restriction of either 
validation or access rights or both [10]. Agreement 
upon data validity is thereby dependent on both well-
allocated write rights to write data (content) to the 
ledger and an appropriate consensus algorithm to 
preserve its state. Further, the notion of smart 
contracts brings a form of algorithmic governance, 
providing an agreed upon, deterministic sequence of 
events based on input criteria [28], [29]. Same as 
smart contracts, and other information systems, the 
overall blockchain system is subject to change over 
time [30] and thus requires a corresponding process. 
Drawn from the previous arguments, it can be 
seen that forms of organizing, hence the decision-
making process, in and around blockchain systems 
vary and clear responsibilities are hard to be 
assigned. It remains unexplored, which decisions are 
deemed central to blockchain systems and which 
actors or organizations actually sit in the driver’s 
seat, if there is one at all, and steer the development 
of blockchain systems. This demands exploration in 
the field.  
 
3. Methodology 
 
In the form of an exploratory study [31], [32], we 
assured a wide coverage of information and (1) 
derived codings based on practitioner’s view and 
scientific literature (literature review, grey literature 
review), (2) found a suitable sample to apply those 
codings (Interviews, Code Review), and (3) utilized 
internal as well as external feedback for sense-
making (data analysis and evaluation and 
refinement). We detail these steps in the following.  
Step 1: Literature review. This research began 
with an in-depth literature review following the 
methodology proposed by vom Brocke et al. [33]. 
The scope of the search has been set on governance 
and how it translates to the blockchain realm in order 
to find core decisions blockchain projects have to 
conduct (RQ1). We utilized those as a lens to study 
our case sample in a subsequent step. To assure a 
consistent search, we first specified what is 
commonly understood as governance, and which 
parts we specifically address. In a next step, we 
searched for literature on the main global repositories 
ACM, Scopus, and Google Scholar, utilizing the 
following search terms (and their variations): 
‘Blockchain governance’, ‘inter-organizational 
governance’, ‘shared governance’, ‘blockchain 
decision-making’, ‘decentralized governance’. To 
assure an overview as comprehensive as possible on 
this topic, and to include also practitioners’ views on 
blockchain governance, a number of further 
information sources were used as described in step 3. 
All sources combined served as our basis for our 
synthesis. 
Step 2: Interviews. To study the enactment of 
decisions in practice (RQ2), we searched for mature 
blockchain systems as our empirical field, which 
proved difficult because blockchain’s recent 
emergence has not allowed for many well-established 
systems. From a longlist of 121 companies, which we 
identified through Coindesk, Crunchbase (both 
widely considered the most authoritative specialized 
news source), and LinkedIn, we selected 49 as we 
saw the best prospect in them concerning their 
organizational maturity. Then we identified and 
invited representatives from those cases for 
interviews. 18 of them accepted our invitation (table 
2). To assure the right framing of the interview 
setting and the right person to speak to, we prepared 
and sent sample interview questions beforehand. The 
interviews followed the notion of semi-structured 
expert interviews [34], mostly conducted via Skype, 
and were recorded and transcribed for coding. In 
some cases, two representatives from the same 
company holding different positions were 
interviewed. This allowed to gain different 
perspectives on the same case.  
Step 3: Grey literature review. As a 
complementary source of information to expert 
interviews, whitepapers and documents of all sorts 
regarding those cases were helpful to understand the 
features of each blockchain system and its high-level 
architecture. The organization’s website and press 
articles (e.g., Coinbase) were also considered useful 
sources of information, as they reflected opinions on 
the topic and addressed issues by those companies. 
Step 4: Source code and smart contracts. We 
further reviewed the source code of those company’s 
systems we interviewed, if publicly available. 
Page 4537
  
 
Table 2. Interview Sample 
Date Interview No. Case No. Domain Location Maturity Role of Interviewee 
29.05.17 I1 1 Land Registry Ghana PoC CEO 
31.05.17 I2 2 Land Registry Honduras PoC Project Manager 
02.06.17 I3 3 Supply Chain USA Operational IT Employee 
20.10.17 I4 4 Cryptocurrency Globally Operational Team Coach 
25.10.17 I5 5 Land Registry Estonia/Sweden Completed PoC Project Lead 
26.10.17 I6 6 Cryptocurrency Globally Operational Project Lead 
30.10.17 I7 7 Supply chain Switzerland Conceptual Board Member 
31.10.17 I8 8 Cryptocurrency Globally Conceptual Project Lead 
01.11.17 I9 9 Supply chain China Conceptual CEO and Founder 
03.11.17 I10 10 IPR Globally Completed PoC Associate Director 
07.11.17 I11 11 Supply chain Belgium PoC Co-founder and CPO 
10.11.17 I12 10 IPR Globally Conceptual Application Engineer 
15.11.17 I13 12 Cryptocurrency Switzerland Operational IT Director 
17.11.17 I14 11 Supply Chain Belgium Completed PoC Business Developer 
17.11.17 I15 13 IPR Globally Operational Application Director 
20.11.17 I16 14 Land Registry Georgia PoC Security Managers 
23.11.17 I17 14 Land Registry Georgia Conceptual Project Manager 
23.03.18 I18 15 Cryptocurrency Switzerland Completed PoC CEO 
The purpose of this step has been to see in how 
far algorithmic governance (smart contracts) is 
utilized to support governance functions and how 
they are encoded. Further, this step increases the 
internal validity of information obtained during 
interviews as it confirms the interviewee’s reasoning. 
Step 5: Data Analysis. As a first step of sense-
making, we coded obtained scientific and grey 
literature, blockchain source code, and interview 
transcriptions. The objective of using multiple 
sources of data was to compare and cross-check the 
data collected through interviews from people with 
different perspectives. Each interview was 
transcribed and coded. Coding dimensions were 
derived by literature and centered around: 1) The 
involved actors and their responsibilities, 2) the type 
of blockchain in use, 3) chosen consensus 
mechanism, 4) decisions taken by the actors 5), the 
current phase of the project, and 6) the expected 
advantages of using blockchain technology. The 
results of this analysis concerned the blockchain 
governance decisions as well as their enactment in 
practice, as described in results.  
Step 6: Evaluation and Refinement. Once our 
initial results were clarified, we sought for feedback. 
We thereby made our results available to co-
researcher as well as practitioners working in the 
blockchain realm. This phase has been conducted in 
an iterative fashion until theoretical saturation was 
achieved. The experts’ feedback was then considered 
appropriately in the further design of this research.  
 
4. Results 
 
As for RQ1, a review of academic literature, grey 
literature, interviews, and code analysis revealed six 
core blockchain governance decisions (see table 3). 
We describe each decision in 4.1 and relate them first 
to literature and second to our cases. Section 4.2 then 
details the fashion in which they are enacted, 
targeting RQ2. 
 
4.1 Blockchain Governance Decisions  
 
Demand Management (DM). Demand 
Management regards who decides on how to enhance 
the blockchain system when novel requirements 
emerge. For example, if there are changes necessary 
to the API or business architecture, who is involved 
and decides on the adjustment of those (single actors 
vs. consensus among many) and how the decision 
would be made (ad-hoc vs. planned); actors can be 
internal (e.g. users) or external actors (standard-
setting bodies, regulators). 
Related to Demand Management, Walport [3] 
argues that in order to avoid degradation of the 
technology and to serve a long lifetime, the 
blockchain should be continuously updated and 
enhanced. Okada et al. [35] emphasized the 
importance of this decision referring to 
organizational decision-making and interoperability. 
Decisions on standards may also be made here, 
easing challenges in interoperability as blockchains 
vary in codebase and infrastructure; standards 
certainly help the organization to select the most 
appropriate blockchain for their businesses [36], [37]. 
Similarly to Weill and Ross [19], this decision refers 
to “Business Application Needs” and “IT Investment 
and Prioritization”; in blockchain systems, however, 
the fashion in which those requirements are decided 
upon (community vs. hierarchical decision) varies. 
Data Authenticity (DA). Data Authenticity 
regards two aspects: Data input as well as its 
preservation.    
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Table 3. Blockchain Decisions and Exemplary Quotes 
Decision Description Exemplary quotes from cases 
Demand 
Management  
who decides and how 
decisions are enacted 
when novel business 
requirements emerge.  
“Master node selects those projects, (…), we are using the mining rewards to fund these projects, basically, 45% of the mining 
rewards goes to miners and 45% to the master nodes, and they are rewarded for providing this hardware to the network. So, in our 
network, there are miners and master nodes who are receiving the rewards and 10% goes to our self-funding system treasure.” (I6)  
“Right now, we are about to upgrade our network, and this is being done through a discussion between just a small handful of 
developers, it’s a small network, and it's fairly easy to achieve verbal consensus for a change.” (I5) 
 “The (…) government is fully controlling the rules of the blockchain that can be audited by the third parties, so I think the process 
will look as following: They will propose something they want to add.” (I14) 
“We are talking to a number of parties to check whether in the future we can get a standardized object model for instance. So, we 
contacted standard-setting organizations, (…) but it will take years before we really have a standard implementation.” (I8) 
Data Authenticity who writes data to the 
ledger and who 
validates transactions 
and hence is 
responsible for data 
quality in the ledger. 
“We use Proof-of-stake, so every party that has a node has a voting power (…). Every individual node can register the data.” (I6)  
“In a private blockchain, we don’t have miners but instead we have a number of entities 4 to 15 may be who sign what transactions 
are allowing to the blockchain so they have a notary function and they don’t necessarily need to be one of the parties to add the 
smart contract or any transactions.” (I2) 
“When the artist makes the claims, people cast their opinion. Based on majority votes it is declared whether it is valid.” (I15) 
“All the miners have to agree. When they agree that the block is solved and it goes in the ledger (...).” (I1, in line with I8) 
System Architecture 
Development 
who decides over 
requirements and 
functionalities of the 
blockchain system.  
“Since it’s an AG, the shareholders have the usual rights. The token holders can vote on milestones, which will unlock further (…) 
tokens. It was our initiative to reform the traditional system with the blockchain solution, and we also ensured the feasibility, 
requirements, features of the solution.” (I4) 
If there is a bug fix or something like that (our partner) will say we would like to push this out to all 8 or 9 nodes, (which causes) a 
single point of failure. Instead: Each node pulls (the code) and they should check because every node is responsible for what they 
do and if we can push out.” (I5) 
“(…) so, we will make the bug fixes and the decision to deploy and to determine the priority the community will take it.” (I8)  
“We will have some kind of start-up groups dependent on the underlying products. I think that is practical because if we have ten 
banks who form the core developers. Everybody got a different opinion so we will end up having troubles.” (I12) 
Membership granting or denying 
requests to partake in 
the network. 
“The port authority will take this role. It won't be the port authority on its own. They will form a (…) private company such that 
(it) can do governance on the blockchain, that will allow people to join.” (I11) 
 “Right now, the (state agency) is authorizing to join this network, I think after some time back, they will announce that everything 
is working good, and they will ask some other third party to decide this, but I don’t know when it will happen.” (I17) 
Ownership Disputes resolving a conflict 
when multiple users 
claim for the same 
asset (e.g. land 
ownership document 
or intellectual 
artwork). 
“They have to go to real world copyright law. They will use for example such claims as additional evidence in resolving the 
disputes and this means you need to the system cannot resolve the conflict by itself it has to assign it to the human layer legal 
system and all of that. This claim is the additional evidence that something happened that specific domain.” (I15) 
“The court system with its own private key is allowed to overwrite. Whatever so in a system of not using on chain currency it’s 
more equation of making sure that everything gets notarized properly. So, if the court will revert something, they can’t edit the 
blockchain what was before and what they revert it, it’s more about openness then finality on the level of the policy.” (I2) 
Transaction 
Reversal 
Decision on reversing 
unintended 
transactions. 
“Once the currency is sent, its sent to that private key and there is no way to retrieve it back.” (I1) 
 “The user, the user is responsible for their own actions on the network, there is no corporation, there is no way for the development 
team or the miners to reverse the transaction or correct any error transaction. You send the money and its gone.” (I8) 
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The former regards the content written to the 
ledger, either from single (e.g. land registries) or 
multiple parties (e.g. Bitcoin). The latter regards 
transaction validation and data preservation, steered 
through a blockchain’s protocol and the use of 
consensus algorithms on a transactional level [12], 
[38], of which proof-of-work, and increasingly proof-
of-stake, are used. Both factors together,  define data 
quality on the ledger and have been found of 
paramount importance in the literature [21], [39]. 
System Architecture Development (SAD). The 
decision on the System Architecture Development 
describes who decides over requirements and 
functionalities of the initial as well as consequent 
blockchain system. E.g., which technology shall be 
used, or ensuring the system’s interoperability when 
concatenated with other systems. This task is 
delegated in some application domains to open 
source developers, others are dependent on a 
professional software development team. 
System developers will tailor an IT solution 
always to their interpretation, which causes a natural 
dependency [40]. The same holds true for blockchain 
systems, on which developers have major influence. 
As suggested by Glaser [41], Walport [3], and Hsieh 
et al. [42] the actors who develop and maintain a 
blockchain’s system are key stakeholders and hold 
major influence. Echoing the work of Weill and Ross 
[19], this decision refers to “IT Architecture” and “IT 
Infrastructure Strategies”. 
Membership (M). Membership refers to granting 
or denying requests to partake in the network [35]. 
This decision is non-existent for public and 
permissionless blockchains, as there is no actor to 
control permissions to participate in the system, 
whereas in private and permissioned blockchains, 
read and write permissions are monitored by a central 
locus of decision making. For those systems, Okada 
et al. [35] stresses the importance of a trusted 
authority who has the power over the system and can 
grant or deny permission to participate in the system.  
Ownership Disputes (OD). This decision is 
applicable only to applications where a wallet or 
token represent a belonging to a user, such as in cases 
regarding land registry or intellectual property rights. 
As found in our cases, there may be disputes over the 
ownership of assets, such as land property documents 
or intellectual work among the users. Ownership 
could thereby be falsely assigned to more than one 
party or revoked too soon. In traditional systems, 
courts are involved in resolving such conflicts [43], 
[44]; on blockchains, however, there is a need to 
identify actors who resolve conflicts when multiple 
users claim for the same property.  
Transaction Reversal (TR). This decision refers 
to the case when the actor, intentionally or 
unintentionally (e.g. hacks), performs an unintended 
transaction, e.g. the transfer of assets to a wrong 
account, and wishes its reversal. The corresponding 
decision would reverse or correct the erroneous 
transaction. In all the researched application domains, 
there is no actor in charge of this decision, even 
though evidence of erroneous transactions has been 
found. This decision challenges the blockchain’s 
dogma of immutability but has been deemed 
necessary in case of major damages. The process of 
reversing transactions is fierce, but possible, when a 
consensus among major stakeholders within and 
around a blockchain system is reached [21]. 
 
4.2 The Prospect of Blockchains for Changes 
of Governance 
 
Deriving core decisions for blockchain systems 
(RQ1) served as a lens to analyze how those 
decisions translate into practice (RQ2). In the 
following, we illustrate their enactment on studied 
cases divided by domains. 
Supply Chains (SCs). Calls regarding supply 
chain inefficiencies and the need for informational 
and processual integration and transparency are 
echoed for decades [45], [46], but often went unheard 
[1], [2]. Our sample inheres four cases from the 
supply chain domain, partly varying in motivation to 
apply blockchain technology. C3 (platform 
developer, hence not mentioned in the table) and C9, 
e.g., target the product flow (Know-Your-Object) for 
not only cost efficiencies but transparency along the 
supply chain. C7, on the other hand, utilizes IoT-
sensors for good distribution practice, measuring and 
guaranteeing the temperature of medical goods to 
other supply chain participants. 
Table 4. Decisions mapped to Supply Chain 
Cases 
 Case 7  Case 9 Case 11 
DM 
External 
Consortium 
External 
Consortium. State 
sets standards. 
External 
Consortium. State 
sets standards. 
SAD 
Developers 
propose, 
consortium decides 
Focal company in 
collaboration with 
state agency 
Company decides, 
Consortium 
prioritizes 
TR  
Individual user’s 
responsibility 
Individual user’s 
responsibility 
Individual user’s 
responsibility 
OD Appeal to courts Appeal to courts Appeal to courts 
M 
Not applicable  Not applicable  Port authority 
with companies 
DA 
Sensor-based, 
Cons.-Algorithm 
Consensus 
Algorithm (PoS) 
Contractual 
(Smart Contracts) 
C11, a port administration in Belgium, aims to 
automatize the check-in and check-out of its 
hundreds of daily customers and their containers, 
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storing a unique identifier for each of them in their 
blockchain system. 
As it can be seen from table 4, the decision rights 
for Demand Management are centralized in 
consortia’s, where formal consensus among 
stakeholders has to be found. This is also due the 
permissioned nature of all blockchain systems. As 
case 11 regards a public function, the state imposes 
standards. Consortia and their (business) users exhibit 
consequently power over the system’s architecture 
and its further development. As for the Transaction 
Reversals, all three use cases do not foresee measures 
to reverse those; this may be due to the fact that none 
of those cases is operational, yet. In case of 
ownership disputes, all cases refer to courts. As for 
the Membership, the systems of C7 and C9 plan to 
become permissioned and public: users may hence 
read entries, but validation is permissioned. Data 
Authenticity is assured through mining on C7 and 
C9, while C11 utilizes permissioned solution. 
Land Registry (LR). The prospect of registering 
land on a blockchain gained increasing attention in 
the last years, predominantly in developing countries, 
where trust in authorities tends to be weaker. Not 
only third parties are tried to be replaced by 
blockchains, but also the digitization of paper-based 
and lengthy processes, and cost reductions are sought 
for. Our sample considers four systems (C1, C2, C5, 
C14), whose goals overlap but slightly differ.  
Table 5. Decisions mapped to Land Registry 
Cases 
 Case 1 / 2 / 14 Case 5 
DM Dictated by state agency Dictated by state agency 
SAD 
State agency and 
associated actors 
State agency  
TR Appeal to courts Appeal to courts 
OD Appeal to courts Appeal to courts 
M State Agency and affiliates State Agency and affiliates 
DA State Agency, Auditors State Agency, Auditors 
As a state function is performed, the state 
maintains the control over the System Architecture 
and Development as well as standards or 
enhancements. Further, the state assures Data 
Authenticity through the ledger, through 
concatenation of different blockchains, as well as 
through closer collaboration with affiliates (notaries, 
banks), using auditory nodes. In case of Transaction 
Reversals or conflict resolution, a user must appeal to 
court. While the partaking actors in the ecosystem do 
not change, users still benefit from transparency and 
reliability of records. 
Cryptocurrencies (C). The case of blockchain-
based cryptocurrencies concerns the first application 
area of blockchains overall. Cases 4, 6, as well as 8 
illustrate our cases’ decision placement below (case 
14 refers to a consortium and is hence not listed).  
In contrast to the previous cases, the blockchain-
based cryptocurrencies are mostly built on public and 
permissionless ledgers, thus allowing members to 
partake in System Architecture and Development (via 
community discussions and votes and all the typical 
processes of FOSS) as well as Data Authenticity 
through mining (validating). 
Table 6. Decisions mapped to 
Cryptocurrency Cases 
 Case 4 / 15 Case 6 Case 8 
DM 
Users propose 
enhancements, 
developers decide  
Team lead and 
two software 
developers  
User propose 
enhancements, 
auditors decide 
SAD 
Group of core 
developers 
Anonymous 
developers 
Company's core 
team members 
TR 
Individual user’s 
responsibility 
Individual user’s 
responsibility 
Individual user’s 
responsibility 
OD Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
M 
Not applicable 
(Permissionless) 
Not applicable 
(Permissionless) 
Not applicable 
(Permissionless) 
DA 
Consensus 
Algorithm 
Consensus 
Algorithm 
Consensus 
Algorithm 
In all systems, there is a group of core developers 
implementing the majority’s will – to their 
interpretation. There are limited measures (forks), 
however, if users conduct unintended transactions or 
seek for support in disputes of asset ownership, 
which points at blockchain’s irreversible 
characteristic. The initial design of the platforms, 
however, lays in the hands of its founders.  
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Management. 
As for intellectual property rights management, we 
interviewed three experts from two companies (C10, 
C13). Those projects aim to ease the management of 
intellectual property rights through unique identifiers 
and instant charge for usage of copyrights. 
Traditionally, those processes can be considered non-
transparent and bureaucratic. The cases below 
illustrate the aspired blockchain system and their 
decision placements. 
Table 7. Decisions mapped to IPR Cases 
 Case 10 Case 13 
DM 
Company decides based on 
community vote 
PoC: Consensus among 
stakeholders 
SAD 
Foundation, software 
provider 
Company's core team 
members 
TR  
Individual user’s 
responsibility 
Individual user’s 
responsibility 
OD Appeal to courts Appeal to courts 
M 
Not applicable 
(Permissionless) 
Not applicable  
DA Community-based Consensus Algorithm 
As for the Demand Management, both systems 
vary in terms of decision-making power: While case 
10 emphasizes the rather open, community-based 
vote, case 13 utilizes a permissioned system. Being 
backed by a foundation, case 10 derived its initial 
system architecture in collaboration with its users; 
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case 13’s design is based on developer’s choices. As 
for ownership disputes, both systems refer to actual 
courts. Data Authenticity is assured through 
consensus algorithms and the access to all 
transactions is public.  
 
5. Discussion  
 
In the results section, we have distilled the major 
decisions that blockchain systems have to conduct. 
This answered RQ1. To answer RQ2, we have shown 
how those decision rights are mapped in a variety of 
cases. To complement RQ2, the fashion of their 
enactment, a wider discussion follows. Considering 
the matrices produced by matching the main aspects 
of decision-making and the empirical domains of 
application, we distilled the main points that 
characterize blockchain governance and thus 
influence the types of decisions to be made (RQ1) as 
well as their enactment (RQ2): a) External 
legitimation, b) reduction of discretionality, c) 
patrolling borders, and d) temporal management.  
External Legitimation. Blockchain technology 
finds its origins in the rejection of external authorities 
but, interestingly enough, states and other authorities 
are now deploying blockchains. Even if in most cases 
their control and power over these multi-party 
systems is relatively limited, when they are present 
their role is not marginal as it can be seen in the 
rather centralized decision-making placement in 
cases 1, 2, 14, and 5. Indeed, especially when the 
state weights in, legitimacy is outside of the 
consensus mechanisms inscribed and deployed by 
blockchains. The most evident outcome of state 
presence is the possibility of some sort of appeal that, 
contrary to the dogma of immutability [11], allows to 
revert undesirable entries on the ledger, or exercise 
further control, like excluding undesired actors. This 
centralization of major decision rights, which may 
hence correspond to the hierarchical idealtype [16], 
raises the question if those prospected solutions 
indeed overcome core problems found nowadays in 
and around land registries [47], [48]; e.g., decisions 
on Data Authenticity as well as on reversing 
transactions would remain in the hands of the state or 
state-dependent actors (notaries). The prospected 
efficiency gains, however, seem highly desirable. 
Reduction of discretionality. Since blockchains 
are basically consensus mechanisms, ad-hoc 
decisions (i.e. discretionality) are intended to be 
minimized to the early stages of rules settings. Once 
they are built in algorithms, human intervention ends 
up being reduced, to the ideal extreme of people 
remaining ‘out of the loop’. Despite this, 
enhancement, membership and off-the-chain conflict 
resolutions leave the door open for ad-hoc decision-
making as it can be seen in our case sample: Conflict 
resolution remains not in place or through real-life 
courts, membership is either regulated through 
gatekeepers or entirely open, and discussions on 
Demand Management is either enacted hierarchically 
(land registries), in consensus among few (supply 
chains), or in consensus among many 
(cryptocurrencies). This informality stands in contrast 
to the deterministic fashion in which smart contracts 
function [28], which questions smart contract 
adoption maturity [29]. Thus, automatic and human 
decision making appears to take place side-by-side, 
sometimes in competition, but algorithmic 
governance is merging with, rather than substituting, 
other modes of governance.  
Table 8. Overview on Cases and Decision Placement 
Case Domain DM SAD TR OD M DA 
7 SC External Consortium 
Developers propose, 
consortium decides 
Individual user’s 
responsibility 
Appeal to 
courts 
Not applicable  
Sensor-based, 
Cons.-Algorithm 
9 SC External Consortium 
Collaboration with 
state agency 
Individual user’s 
responsibility 
Appeal to 
courts 
Not applicable  
Consensus 
Algorithm (PoS) 
11 SC 
External 
Consortium. 
Company decides, 
Consortium prioritizes 
Individual user’s 
responsibility 
Appeal to 
courts 
Port authority, 
priv. companies 
Contractual 
(Smart Contracts) 
1/2/14 LR 
Dictated by state 
agency 
State agency and 
associated actors 
Appeal to courts 
Appeal to 
courts 
State Agency 
and affiliates 
State Agency, 
Auditors 
5 LR 
Dictated by state 
agency 
State agency Appeal to courts 
Appeal to 
courts 
State Agency 
and affiliates 
State Agency, 
Auditors 
4/15 C 
Users propose, dev. 
decide 
Group of core 
developers 
Individual user’s 
responsibility 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
(Permissionless) 
Consensus 
Algorithm 
6 C 
Team lead and 
engineers 
Anonymous 
developers 
Individual user’s 
responsibility 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
(Permissionless) 
Consensus 
Algorithm 
8 C 
User propose, 
auditors decide 
Company's core team 
members 
Individual user’s 
responsibility 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
(Permissionless) 
Consensus 
Algorithm 
10 IPR 
Community votes, 
company decides 
Foundation, software 
provider 
Individual user’s 
responsibility 
Appeal to 
courts 
Not applicable  Community-based 
13 IPR 
PoC: Consensus 
among stakeholders 
Company's core team 
members 
Individual user’s 
responsibility 
Appeal to 
courts 
Not applicable 
Consensus 
Algorithm 
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Patrolling borders. Related to the previous, it is 
remarkable how in permissioned blockchains, 
patrolling the borders is an effective control 
mechanism. In fact, once one is in, preset rules apply, 
keeping actors out is a way to avoid undesired 
behaviors. Governance issues from other cases such 
as centralization of mining power, coordinated 
takeovers [9], or even take-downs [20] are hereby 
counterbalanced through a steering body and a 
walled-up system. Unless another actors’ identity is 
stolen, the blockchain avoids unwanted access [11]. 
Even then, the clear audit trail of a blockchain [27] 
would allow to retrace misbehavior and reverse 
transactions (in  permissioned systems).  
Using unique and verified identifiers is well 
exemplified by the case of a Belgian’s port authority 
(C11), where the monitoring of in- and out-flow is 
automatized, reducing governance costs of oversight. 
In more general terms, controlling the inflow and 
outflow of any resource can be an effective 
management tool. 
Temporal Management. Last but not least, most 
cases show some sort of temporal dimension in the 
form of enhancements, access control of new 
members, and reversion of transactions, which is in 
line with other operational blockchains [9], [20]. As 
for all information systems, the analyzed blockchain 
cases were initially designed to a core group’s 
interpretation [40], which might have been misled, 
still placing those as key stakeholders exercising 
major influence over those systems [41], [42]. All 
these add human dimensions to decision making and 
spread human influence over long periods of time. 
This rather long-time frame could be problematic for 
management because this new type of systems may 
not live, at least in its current forms, as long as the 
functions that it is intended to perform. This opens 
the problem of future transitions to new technologies 
[30], [49] and for one, it points to the formerly 
introduced notion of tribal behavior [8] of users.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This research studied the governance on and 
around blockchain systems through the lens of six 
core decisions on blockchain systems: Decisions on 
Demand Management, Data Authenticity, System 
Architecture Development, Membership, Ownership 
Disputes, and Transaction Reversals. Illustrating their 
enactment on empirical cases guided our 
understanding how power in those cases is distributed 
and in which fashion (algorithmic, ad-hoc, formal). 
Our results show various forms of enactment and a 
new division of labor between human and 
algorithmic decision-making.  
Of course, this research is not free from 
limitations. First and foremost, governance, implicit 
or explicit, emerges in practice and over time. The 
field, however, especially for permissioned 
blockchain systems, can be considered in its infancy. 
So, the amount of solid cases remains limited. Our 
research, therefore, rather than making conclusive 
statements, strives to highlight emerging problems in 
an exploratory manner. 
Our research not only answers the call for further 
research on governance in and around blockchain 
systems, but also anticipates the consequences of 
those decision in practice, which may also afftect 
practitioners. 
In conclusion, it is worth to consider, for further 
empirical research, if those systems of blockchain 
end up in letting users to have more influence on 
decisions, or if they are ultimately deprived of what 
is automatized by consensus algorithms. One way or 
the other, following what and when people put their 
trust in, is a promising way to understand blockchains 
in practice. 
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